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Abstract
The South African downstream petroleum industry
was in the hands of Whites and Multinational Oil
Companies during the apartheid era. Many
Historically Disadvantaged South Africans
(HDSA’s) were excluded from the mainstream
industry through, among other instruments, laws
passed by the government such as the Petroleum
Products Act 120 of 1977. Against this background,
the newly elected democratic government instituted
a policy process aimed at restructuring and trans-
forming the petroleum industry to allow HDSA’s to
enter the industry, in order to achieve sustainable
presence, ownership and control of approximately a
quarter of the industry by previously disadvantaged
individuals. Since the introduction of this process,
which culminated in the release of the White Paper
on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa
(1998), little progress has been made towards
achieving this government’s key policy objective.
Instead, there is still little entry into the industry by
HDSA’s, and the Black Oil Companies (BOC’s) that
are in the industry continue to struggle to increase
their market share. This paper discusses the possible
constraints on achieving the objective, by looking at
barriers that impede HDSA’s from entering the
industry and BOC’s from increasing their market
share significantly. There are three possible cate-
gories of barriers in the downstream petroleum
industry, namely, economic barriers to entry, non-
economic barriers, and cross-sectoral barriers to
entry, which are discussed in this paper. These cate-
gories of barriers prevent entry by HDSA’s into the
industry and hinder BOC’s from increasing their
market share. To circumvent these barriers, and in
order to make progress towards achieving the gov-
ernment’s key policy objective of control by approx-
imately a quarter of the HDSA’s, a black economic
empowerment model was developed. This model
seeks to increase the market share of the BOC’s and
the presence of the HDSA’s in the industry in a sus-
tainable way without significantly harming the
multinational oil companies. It foresees Govern-
ment licensing BOC’s to purchase up to 5% of the
existing South African fuel demand at an Import
Parity Price (IPP) that is significantly less than the
Basic Fuel Price (BFP). The reason for this differ-
ence is that the BFP is based upon the supply of the
totality of South Africa’s needs from elsewhere,
whereas the IPP merely supplies up to 5% of South
Africa’s needs, and can therefore source the product
from refineries that are closer, so reducing the
transport component. The impact of the loss of 5%
of the internal market for petrol and diesel on the
revenues of the MOC’s is less than 0.5%, because
the difference between the IPP and BFP is a small
fraction of the BFP.
Keywords: downstream petroleum industry, petrole-
um products, basic fuel price, import parity price,
Energy White Paper
1. Background
The 1994 democratic breakthrough opened oppor-
tunities for the Historically Disadvantaged South
Africans (HDSA’s), who had been excluded from
participating in some of the industries in the coun-
try, particularly the downstream petroleum industry.
In the previous dispensation, that is, before 1994,
the Government dealt with issues relating to the
petroleum industry clandestinely. To ensure opacity,
the Government passed the Petroleum Products Act
No 120 of 1977. This Act, ‘prohibited the publica-
tion, releasing, announcement, disclosure, or con-
veyance of information or making of comment
regarding the source, manufacture, transport, desti-
nation, storage, consumption, quantity or stock,
level of any petroleum product acquired or manu-
factured or being acquired or manufactured in the
Republic’.
This Act therefore made it difficult for those who
were not in the industry or Government, particular-
ly Blacks, to acquire information in order to enter
the mainstream industry. Towards, but most notably
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after, the 1994 elections in South Africa, Blacks
formed a number of oil companies, which are strug-
gling to penetrate and capture the market, because
of various constraints which were set up during the
apartheid era and which remain in place.
In an attempt to address these constraints, and
to allow Blacks to enter the industry, a consultative
process was instituted which culminated in the
drawing up of a policy document. This document
was based upon the findings of a wide-ranging
study that involved most of the primary role play-
ers, and was published in the form of a Green Paper
in 1994. Comments received on this paper led in
due course to the White Paper (1998), which out-
lined the Government’s key policy objective as the
need to achieve, ‘sustainable presence, ownership
or control by historically disadvantaged South
Africans of approximately a quarter of all facets of
the liquid fuels industry or plans to achieve this’
(White Paper, 1998: 81). Since the publication of
this document in 1998, little progress has been
made to achieve this key policy objective.
In an attempt to ascertain why the objective has
not been achieved, barriers to entry in the industry
are discussed. The paper seeks to outline those bar-
riers and will approach the discussion, by briefly
unbundling the policy objective, and discussing the
key elements of the milestone, namely; sustainable
presence, ownership and control by a quarter of
previously disadvantaged South Africans.
The paper will outline the barriers to entry in all
the three sub-sectors of the downstream industry,
namely; refining, marketing and retailing. It then
presents a business model for black economic
empowerment, which may assist in realizing the key
objective of the White Paper by making it possible
for HDSA’s to enter the downstream liquid fuels
industry in a sustainable way. It is an important
finding that it should be possible for HDSA’s to take
up at least 5% of the internal market – slightly more
than 1% impact upon the revenues of the existing
refining companies.
2. Profitability of the downstream
petroleum industry
The petroleum industry is an important and crucial
component of the economy in just about all coun-
tries, including South Africa. The contribution of the
industry to the South African economy is huge. For
instance, according to the 2002 South African
Petroleum Industry Association (SAPIA) report, the
total assets of the members of SAPIA were R41 451
million in December 2001, and the total income tax
payments to the state was R1.68 billion in the same
year, as shown in Table 1 below. The industry was
responsible for collecting a range of taxes on fuel,
and total payments to the State during the year
amounted to R17.3 billion.
Table 1 also reflects the wealth of SAPIA mem-
bers, which in practice also translates into market
power and dominance by the member companies.
Their wealth and continuous increase in income is
buttressed, among other instruments, by the profit
margins framework (called the Marketing of
Petroleum Activities Return – MPAR), which regu-
lates the returns of the oil companies in the market-
ing and retailing sub-sectors, excluding refining
activities.
This formula does not cover the refining sub-
sector, since this sub-sector was deregulated in
1991. In other words, the MPAR involves petroleum
related activities outside the refinery gate and other
related activities, namely, storage, transportation,
distribution, marketing and administration.
The profit margin, in terms of the MPAR formu-
la, is determined to yield a benchmark industry
average of 15% rate of return (10%-20% range
with a one year lag) on the depreciated book value
of assets for the year ended December. (Lambrecht
and Doppegieter, 1993). If the returns go above
20%, then a margin decrease is indicated, and if it
falls below the 10% floor, then a margin increase is
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Table 1: Aggregate financial results of SAPIA members
Source: SAPIA Report, 2002
Years ended 31 December
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Operating profit (R/m) 1 307 2 108 1 877 1 649 2 402 2 229 1 987 2 965 5 704 5 687
Interest paid (R/m) (53) (173) (250) (323) (447) (454) (683) (389) (789) (673)
Income tax (R/m) (503) (596) (582) (402) (568) (474) (419) (667) (1249) (1 682)
Net income (R/m) 751 1 339 1 045 924 1 387 1 301 885 1 909 3 666 3 332
Total assets (R/m) 9 389 10 845 13 324 14 466 17 634 18 597 19 546 20 492 34 157 41 451
Capital expenditure (R/m) 1 652 1 558 1 613 1 389 1 377 1 455 1 511 1 542 1 763 2 627
After tax return on assets (%) 8.1 12.3 7.8 6.4 7.9 7.0 4.5 9.3 10.7 8.0
Sales volumes (bn litres) 21.1 23.6 24.7 28.7 29.4 33.8 31.0 26.6 26.7 26.9
Net income after tax (c/l) 3.6 5.7 4.2 3.3 4.7 3.8 2.9 7.2 13.7 12.4
indicated (Industrial & Petrochemicals Consultants,
2001:26). A problem with this formulation is that it
is impossible to check on the calculation of the book
value of the assets.
The calculation is undertaken by SAPIA, who
face the problem that their members have different
accounting standards and thus different definitions
of book values and probably also different policies
regarding depreciation. It is understood that audi-
tors are prepared to sign off the book value esti-
mates, but we can find no evidence that the audi-
tors are able to overcome the problems outlined
above. The problem with the asset value calculation
is illustrated in Table 1. The year-on-year change in
assets bears no relationship to the annual capital
investment, and often increases by over 25% in a
single year for no apparent reason.
3. Government’s key policy objective
The HDSA’s who are in the industry face major
challenges and constraints that serve to impede
entry into the downstream petroleum industry.
These challenges and constraints include barriers to
entry such as the restrictive regulatory and legal
framework within which oil companies in the down-
stream petroleum industry operate. They also
include economic and non-economic factors, which
deter entry into the industry.
The Government’s key policy objective is to
achieve sustainable presence, ownership, and con-
trol by approximately a quarter of HDSA’s in all
facets of the industry. In an attempt to achieve this
objective, a Charter on the Empowerment of
HDSA’s in the Petroleum and Liquid Fuels Industry,
published in November 2000 (hereinafter referred
to as the Empowerment Charter), was agreed upon
by the main players in the industry, including; the
Government, SAPIA members and African Minerals
and Energy Forum (AMEF) member companies.
The charter makes some proposals on how both the
established companies and the Black Oil Com-
panies (BOC’s), together with the Government,
could achieve sustainable presence, ownership and
control of approximately a quarter of the facets of
industry by HDSA’s.
The Empowerment Charter identifies a number
of barriers such as the refining capacity as a weak-
ness in HDSA companies, and suggests that the oil
refiners should consider amongst other things, sell-
ing shares in their facilities to BOC’s. It should be
added that what is contained in the Charter is with-
in the framework of a number of pieces of legisla-
tion, such as the Preferential Procurement Act No 5
of 2000, the Employment Equity Act No 55 of
1998, the Skills Development Act No 97 of 1998,
and the Competition Act No 89 of 1998.
Even though this Charter is not sufficient to
address all the issues of sustainable presence, own-
ership and control by HDSA’s of a significant pro-
portion of the industry, it highlights and suggests
major aspects such as capacity building for BOC’s,
financing, terms of credit to HDSA’s, public and pri-
vate sector procurement, employment equity, and
access and ownership of joint facilities.
The White Paper on the Energy Policy of the
Republic of South Africa (1998) also expresses the
desire by Government to remove the impediments,
in order to allow previously disadvantaged people
to play a significant role in the petroleum industry.
It also expresses the Government’s determination to
restructure the petroleum industry in order to
achieve significant domestic ownership or control
by HDSA’s and to redress the past imbalances.
It recognises the heavy domination of the petro-
leum industry by Whites, who are a majority in the
entire value chain. This is exacerbated by the fact
that control and ownership of the industry rest in
the hands of the Multinational Oil Companies
(MOC’s).
4. Barriers to entry in the downstream
industry sub-sectors
It appears that HSDA’s face a number of barriers in
entering the downstream industry. We seek to
understand the nature of these barriers to entry and
the factors that prevent new entrants from increas-
ing their market share significantly.
A barrier to entry in the context of the South
African downstream industry may be viewed as, ‘a
socially undesirable limitation to entry of resources,
which are due to protection of resource owners
already in the market’ (Waizsacker, 1980:13). This
may, for example, include the cost that new entrants
or BOC’s in the South African petroleum industry
incur such as start-up capital, and the disadvantage
of competing with well established companies that
have created brand loyalists.
The absence of socially undesirable limitations
to entry will allow indigenous people or HDSA’s
‘easy entry’, ‘a situation in which there is no imped-
iment to entry of new firms, or in which established
firms possess no advantages over potential
entrants’ (Bain, 1962:11). In the downstream petro-
leum industry of South Africa, there are three cate-
gories of barriers to entry, namely; economic, non-
economic, and cross-sectoral barriers.
Economic barriers are those barriers in which
financial requirements are placed above any other
requirement for entry to be possible. The economic
barriers to entry include inter alia the following:
(i) Access to finance to fund projects and run busi-
nesses effectively. This also includes access to
the means of financing projects and providing
collateral to lending institutions such as the
banks and bridging institutions such as Khula
Finance. The inaccessibility of finance is a bar-
rier for potential entrants and BOC’s to pursue
projects that require large capital. For instance,
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to build a service station, BP requires that the
prospective operator should make an appropri-
ate capital investment of approximately R2 mil-
lion for working capital and start up costs
(Sunday Times, 14 July 2002).
(ii) Transport costs incurred in the distribution and
marketing of fuel. For example, the cost of
transporting petroleum products through the
Petronet pipeline from Durban to Sasolburg is
R0.11 per litre (Industrial and Petrochemicals
Consultants, 2001:20). This means that to
transport a hundred thousand litres would cost
the company about R11 000. Building a new
pipeline is more expensive. For instance,
according to Industrial and Petrochemicals
Consultants (2001), the expansion cost planned
by Petronet for its pipeline will cost about R200
million and a new pipeline would cost a R1 bil-
lion.
(iii) Extensive advertising is also a barrier because it
assists a company to create brand loyalists, and
leave new entrants to struggle for customers.
(iv) The other economic barrier is sunk costs. Sunk
costs are generally defined as the capital or
costs that the investor cannot recover upon exit
from the market, and are in many instances,
part of the initial costs. Sunk costs are regarded
as a barrier to entry because (a) would-be
HDSA’s entrants would take sunk costs into
consideration if they decide to enter; (b) BOC’s
that are already in the industry would consider
them if they decide to exit the market; (c) and
above all, the money invested is irrecoverable
after entry and upon exit.
(v) Vertical Integration is also a barrier to entry.
The vertical integration of a company arises
when a company gets involved in the entire
value chain of the industry or stages of produc-
tion, from refining, marketing, and retailing.
The integration of a company vertically, some-
times called economies of sequence, in the
downstream petroleum industry would mean
that a company engages in the retailing, mar-
keting and refining sub-sectors, and leads to
one sub-sector subsidising the other sub-sec-
tor(s). The company involved in these sub-sec-
tors will be enjoying the benefits of economies
of sequence and impedes entry to other sub-
sectors.
The non-economic barriers are those barriers
that are not financial in nature and include among
others:
(i) Geographic location of outlet. The BOC’s or
new entrants are at a disadvantaged position
since their service stations are built at un-strate-
gic places, and this affects performance of the
site. Subsidiary to this is the fact that the strate-
gic sites are already having service stations, of
which a majority of them belong to the MOC’s.
(ii) The Service Stations Rationalization Plan
(1962). The number of new service stations was
regulated by the Service Station Rationalisation
Plan (Ratplan), which determined the number
of new stations that could be built in a year.
According to this plan, the purpose of limiting
the number of service stations was to promote
throughput at service stations and thereby
economies of scale (White Paper, 1998).
(iii) Price control. In terms of the Petroleum
Products Act No 120 of 1997, the Government
regulates and determine the price of petrol
through Retail Price Maintenance. Price control
was introduced during the apartheid era, with a
view of ensuring security of supply of petroleum
products by encouraging firms to cut costs in
order to raise profits. This does not allow for the
setting of competitive prices by BOC’s as a
measure to increase their share. This is a barri-
er both to entry by HDSA’s and growth of the
BOC’s. For example, the diesel market share of
BOC’s is always higher compared to petrol as
reflected in Table 2 for the years 1999, 2000
and 2001, a success which is the result of
uncontrolled or competitive diesel price, and
because diesel can be discounted.
(iv) Import control. In terms of the Petroleum
Products Act of 1977, refined petroleum prod-
ucts could only be imported only if there is
domestic shortage.
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Table 2: Market shares of petrol and diesel
NB: Table adapted from the 2002 SAPIA Annual Report
1999 2000 2001
Company Petrol Diesel Petrol Diesel Petrol Diesel
Afric Oil 0.05 0.55 0.02 0.19 0.04 0.19
Caltex 18.05 16.50 17.89 15.82 17.43 16.69
Engen 24.17 23.33 26.78 27.95 27.02 27.25
Exel 1.38 3.80 1.86 4.98 2.23 4.84
Shell 17.99 18.99 17.90 18.33 17.53 17.80
Tepco 0.40 2.36 0.38 2.90 0.33 2.22
(v) The Marketing of Petroleum Activities Return
(MPAR) regulates profit margins. The MPAR
regulates the profit margins of oil companies at
marketing and retailing sub-sectors, excluding
refining activities. This formula is a barrier for
both would be entrants and the BOC’s, because
the profit of a company is limited within the
benchmark industry average of a 15% rate of
return (a 10% – 20% range with a one year lag)
on the depreciated book value of assets. This
does not allow new entrants to grow because it
limits their profitability within the 10% to 20%
range before an adjustment could be made. 
This formula is also unjust because it allows
those who have massive assets to benefit more
than those with small or little assets, the BOC’s.
The cross-sectoral barriers are those economic
or non-economic barriers that are found in two or
all sub-sectors of the industry. There are a few cross-
sectoral barriers in the downstream petroleum
industry, which include among others:
(i) Lack of regulatory support and material sup-
port by the Government. The Government has
also not provided material support through its
own enterprises or even provide a subsidy to
BOC’s, albeit it gave the synthetic fuel (synfuel)
producers, Sasol and Total support. For exam-
ple, the Government owns the transport net-
work company, Petronet the subsidiary of
Transnet, which owns the pipelines from the
port in Durban to the in-land, but does not use
these to provide support to BOC’s. With regard
to subsidy, the Government did not improvise a
subsidy method for BOC’s or new entrants sim-
ilar to that which was provided to Sasol.
According to Business Day (12 June 2003), the
Government has been subsidising Sasol and
Total for their Petronet pipeline transport costs,
and this will be taken away. This can be passed
to the BOC’s for a few years, to aid black eco-
nomic empowerment.
(ii) Environmental Regulation. This form of regula-
tion also reduces the number of entrants into
the refining sub-sector, since the National
Environmental Management Air Quality Bill
2003, empowers a municipality to identify, in
terms of a by-law, substances or mixtures of
substances in ambient air which in any other
way, present or is likely to present a threat to
health or the environment in the municipality.
Since refineries emit a number of pollutants
that are a threat to the environment, they will
be affected by such by-laws or regulations as
may be identified and regulated by the munici-
pality. This also means that, the aforemen-
tioned Act, in order to reduce a controlled sub-
stance the refiner would be required to lower
production output per day to comply with the
required standards, or use expensive technolo-
gy to remove pollutants from the raw products.
This might also pose a problem between the
refiner who wants to increase production and
profit, and the local community, which needs to
protect itself from health risks and the sur-
rounding environment.
In summary, the downstream industry of South
Africa has economic, non-economic, and cross-sec-
toral barriers to entry, which contribute to the fail-
ure by Government to achieve sustainable pres-
ence, ownership, and control as stated in the White
Paper.
5. A business model for Black Economic
Empowerment
In order to see if it was possible to find a way to
cross the barriers to entry identified in the previous
section, a business model was set up which incor-
porated a simple incentive to the MOC’s to permit
HDSA’s to enter the downstream industry in a
meaningful and sustainable way.
This model aimed at capturing at least five per-
cent (5%) of the market share for refined products,
without significantly harming the established oil
companies through importation. In developing the
business model, we start by explaining the structure
of the Basic Fuels Pricing Mechanism.
5.1 Basic Fuels Price calculation
The Basic Fuels Price (BFP) of petrol is based on a
50% spot price assessment by Platts in the
Mediterranean refining area, and a 50% Platts spot
price assessment in Singapore. The price of diesel
and paraffin is based on a 50% Platt’s spot price
assessment in the Arab Gulf, and a 50% Platt’s
assessment in the Mediterranean refining area. The
reason given for the difference in approach is that
there is insufficient spare petrol in the Gulf to base
local pricing on that source.
The international component of the BFP also
includes Free On Board (FOB), demurrage, ocean
loss, stock financing and coastal storage. The stan-
dard international freight tariffs from the Worldscale
publication for voyages from the Mediterranean to
South African ports are used as a base.
The latest market trends for different types of
vessels are incorporated into a market rate, which is
then applied to the standard tariff or Worldscale to
determine the freight cost. The insurance tariffs for
different voyages according to prevailing risks to
and from different areas are determined by Lloyds
of London. Moreover, the evaporation loss of 0,3%
for petroleum products is accepted as normal and is
not insurable, thus the loss has to be borne by the
buyer who therefore has a financial loss of 0,3%.
The BFP calculations of the price of Mogas 95
Unleaded in May-June 2003 are shown in Table 3.
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The average BFP was 185.115c/litre, and the R:$
rate was 8.0144 for the period.
Table 3: Average BFP for 95 unleaded for the
period 26 May to 25 June 2003
Platts FOB Med Mean ($/T) 264 065
Platts FOB Med Mean ($/Bbl) 31 625
Platts Singapore Mean ($/Bbl) 31 005
50% Med and 50% Singapore 31 315
In South African cents per litre
FOB 157 074
Sea Freight 20 461
Demurrage 1 067
Insurance 0 268
Cost with Insurance and Freight (CIF) 178 869
Ocean Leakage 0 537
Wharfage 1 836
Landed Cost at average of SA Ports 181 242
Coastal Storage 2 083
Financing Cost 1 790
Basic Fuels Price 185 115
(b) BFP for Diesel 0.3%
The Diesel (Gasoil) 0.3% sulphur is calculated
based on 50% of the Med FOB mean value for
Gasoil 0.2% ($/ton) and 50% of the FOB Arab Gulf
mean value for Gasoil 0.25% ($/Bbl), plus the quot-
ed Arab Gulf spot premium for this grade. Table 4
shows the average for Diesel 0.3% in May-June
2003.
5.2 The supply of refined products
At the present moment, there is no oil company that
imports refined products. Most of the petroleum
products are refined locally. The total production in
2001 was 12 674 million litres of petrol, and 8 539
million litres of diesel as shown in Figure 1. The syn-
fuel producers contributed 4 577 million litres of
petrol, and 1 769 million litres of diesel to the com-
bined total production.
However, production was in excess to internal
demands, and 1 473 million litres of petrol and 1
130 million litres of diesel were exported out of the
Southern African Development Community
(SADC) zone. The refineries therefore exported
about 18% of their total production outside the
SADC zone.
Some excess capacity is needed to meet season-
al peaks in demand. In Southern Africa, there is
normally an increase in demand in summer for
petrol for vacation motoring and in spring for diesel
for agricultural production. However, the excess
consumption during these peak periods is signifi-
cantly less than nearly 20% of the annual demand,
so in effect there is a surplus to be exported
throughout the year.
It is questionable whether this surplus will con-
tinue. Growth in demand for liquid fuels has been
low. SAPIA has predicted future increases in
demand, and shifts in the capacity balance, as
shown in Table 5, from which it is clear that a sig-
nificant excess will remain for the foreseeable
future, even in the face of a higher-than-normal
growth in demand.
The refiners sell their excess products to other
countries at an Export Parity Price (EPP), which is
not declared but which must be much lower than
the Import Parity Price (IPP). This we can tell if we
reverse the calculations shown in Tables 3 and 4
above. For example, in June 2003 the average
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Figure 1: Petrol and diesel production and
export in 2001
Table 4: Average BFP for diesel 0.3% in May-
June 2003 (according to DME  formula)
Platts FOB Med Mean ($/ton) 223 571
Platts FOB Med Mean ($/Bbl) 29 969
Platts FOB Arab Gulf Mean ($/Bbl) 26 573
Platts Premium FOB Arab Gulf 
Mean ($/bbl) 1 320
50% Med and 50% Arab Gulf 26 573
In South African cents per litre
FOB 145 297
Freight 22 227
Demurrage 1 195
Insurance 0 253
C I F 168 972
Ocean Leakage 0 507
Landing & Wharfage 1 836
Landed Cost at average of SA Ports171 315
Coastal Storage 2 083
Financing Cost 1 692
Basic Fuels Price 175 090
price of Unleaded Mogas 95 at the refinery gate in
Singapore was 155.519 SA c/l. If the local refiners
were to export their petrol to Singapore, their FOB
export price would have to be 131.350c/l to com-
pete, as shown in Table 6. Similarly for 0.3% sul-
phur diesel the average Med price of Gasoil 0.25%
sulphur was 163.866 c/l. Local refiners would sell
diesel at the FOB export price of 120.259 c/l to sell
their diesel, and that would require them to improve
sulphur levels from 0.3% to 0.25%, which might
bring the FOB price even lower. The calculation is
shown in Table 7.
Table 6: Average EPP of 95 Unleaded bound for
Singapore, June 2003
Singapore Unleaded (US$/Bbl) 31.005
In South African cents per litre
Singapore Price 155.5191
Wharfage 1.836
Sea Freight 20.461
Demurrage 1.067
Insurance 0.268
C.I.F 131.8871
Ocean Leakage 0.537
Export Parity Price 131.3501
Table 7: Average EPP of 0.3% sulphur diesel for
Med, June 2003
Average Platts Med (US$/Bbl) 29.969
In South African cents per litre
Med Price 150.511
Wharfage 1.836
Sea Freight 26.461
Demurrage 1.195
Insurance 0.253
C.I.F 120.766
Ocean Leakage 0.507
Export Parity Price 120.259
5.3 Import Parity Price
The prices of products in South Africa are based on
the Basic Fuels Price (BFP), which assumes that
there is no refining industry in South Africa, and all
products are imported as refined from the
Mediterranean, Arab Gulf and Singapore.
However, South Africa has a local refining industry
and could import small quantities of products with-
out upsetting the industry. The Import Parity Price
(IPP) would be lower than the BFP as can be seen
in Tables 8 and 9.
(a) IPP for 95 Unleaded, Ex Arab Gulf
The Import Parity Price for 95 Unleaded imported
ex-Arab Gulf, would be cheaper than the BFP
because there would be no component of the price
derived from the far more expensive Singapore
product, and lower freight charges. The average IPP
of 95 Unleaded from the Gulf was 162.64c/l as
shown in Table 8, which is cheaper than 95
Unleaded calculated at the BFP in the same month,
June 2003, 185.115c/l, by about 22.5c/l.
Table 8: IPP for 95 Unleaded, Ex Arab Gulf (on
average in June 2003)
FOB Jebel Ali Premium Unleaded 
(in US dollars per barrel) 28.225
In South African cents per litre
FOB 140.07
Sea Freight 15.36
Demurrage 1.05
Insurance 0.23
C.I.F 157.71
Ocean Leakage 0.47
Wharfage 1.84
Landed Cost 159.02
Coastal Storage 2.08
Financing Cost 1.54
Import Parity Price 162.64
Basic Fuels Price 185.115
(b) IPP for Diesel 0.3% Ex Arab Gulf
The price of diesel from the Arab Gulf is 164.989c/l
as shown in Table 9, which is 10.11 cents per litre
cheaper than the BFP in June 2003. In this case,
the difference between the BFP and the IPP is not
as great as in the case of petrol, because there is a
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Table 5: Inland demand /Refining capacity balance (millions of litres)
Source: SAPIA 2002 Annual Report
Products 2001 2001 2001 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005
Refining Demand Surplus/ Refining Low Low High High
capacity actual (shortfall) capacity growth growth growth growth
actual actual demand surplus/ demand surplus/
shortfall shortfall
Petrol 12674 11201 1473 13190 11239 1951 12 329 861
Diesel 8539 7409 1130 9543 7926 1617 8663 880
component of Gulf diesel pricing in the BFP calcu-
lation. Nevertheless, because it will always be
cheaper to source small quantities of diesel from the
Gulf than from the Med, the IPP will always be
lower than the BFP.
Table 9: IPP for Diesel 0.3%, Ex Arab Gulf (on
average in June 2003)
Platts Arab Gulf Gasoil 0.25% 
Mean (US$/Bbl) 26.850
Platts Arab Gulf Premium Mean (US$/Bbl) 1.33
In South African cents per litre
FOB 140.244
Sea Freight 17.424
Demurrage 1.118
Insurance 0.243
C.I.F 159.030
Ocean Leakage 0.480
Wharfage 1.840
Landed Cost 161.349
Coastal Storage 2.080
Financing Cost 1.560
Import Parity Price 164.989
Basic Fuel Price 175.090
5.4 The business model
Based upon the above findings, it is possible to pro-
pose a sustainable business. In principle, a new
entrant could import small quantities of products
directly from the Gulf. The quantities imported
could not be very great, because there is compara-
tively little excess capacity in the Gulf refining sec-
tor. Nevertheless, it could certainly amount to 5% of
the existing inland markets for refined products
excluding synfuels, that is, about 400 million litres
of petrol and 350 million litres of diesel. The prod-
ucts could be landed at the IPP and thus give suffi-
cient margin relative to the BFP to sustain the busi-
ness.
If the new entrant was permitted to import fuel
directly, then it would displace the existing products
from the South African market, which would then
have to be exported. As we have seen, considerable
export of products already takes place, so all that
would be necessary is for Government, in issuing
permission to the new entrant to import fuel, is a
request to the refining industry to increase exports
by an equal amount.
However, as we have seen, the EPP is even
lower than the IPP. There would be little point in
importing products at a higher price than the EPP. It
would be better for the refining industry if the
would-be importer was permitted to purchase fuel
that would have been exported from the refiners at
a price above EPP. The refiners would see a higher
netback than exporting it at the EPP, and the new
entrant would have a product for sale at possibly
even lower than the IPP, although as a small player
in the market, it would probably not have the nego-
tiating power to purchase it at significantly below
the IPP.
The impact of the State permitting such pur-
chases from the existing refiners would be minimal.
If the new entrant reduced the market share of the
refiners by five percent (5%) as shown in Table 10
and Table 11, the impact on the revenue of the
refiners will be minimal, namely 0.5% for petrol and
0.26% for diesel.
The market share and revenue figures exclude
the products and revenue of the local synfuel com-
panies, namely Sasol and PetroSA. Tables 10 and
11 also show that new entrant costs for the pur-
chase of petrol would be R538.3 million and
R574.2 million for diesel, or a total of R1112.5 mil-
lion.
However, the added margin of the new entrant,
relative to those who would purchase fuel at the
BFP from the refineries, would be R74.4million in
respect of petrol and R35.1million for diesel, or a
total of R109.5 million. We believe this should pro-
vide sufficient competitive advantage to the new
entrant to enable him to overcome the barriers to
entry identified in previous sections, in establishing
a business in the downstream distribution of liquid
fuels.
This model would circumvent the barriers to
entry identified in the previous sections. For exam-
ple, economies of scale would be discounted since
there is no similar business that specifically deals in
products priced at the IPP. The same applies to
other entry barriers such as, environmental regula-
tions (the new entrant would not refine products),
geographic location of outlets (new business sell to
some of the wholesale/supermarkets outlets), exten-
sive advertising (no competitors, therefore advertis-
ing would be average) and sunk costs.
6. Conclusions
The petroleum industry of South Africa is not
deregulated or liberalized, since there is
Government intervention through regulatory instru-
ments, which also include voluntary agreements
entered into between oil companies.
The agreement that affected entry was among
other instruments the Ratplan, which limited the
number of new entrants at the retail-sub-sector
level. This undoubtedly acted as an entry barrier
since only a limited number of entrants were
allowed to enter the sub-sector.
There are economic barriers to entry, non-eco-
nomic barriers and cross-sectoral barriers, which
impede both entry by HDSA’s and growth of
BOC’s. The above developed business model
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intends to circumvent most of the identified barriers
in order to achieve sustainable presence, owner-
ship, and control by a quarter of HDSA’s in the
industry. Moreover, the model advocates for less
Government involvement in the downstream petro-
leum industry, although it should approve or grant
an import permit, and should maintain the status
quo.
The model propounds an idea in which the
HDSA’s play a crucial role and spearheads eco-
nomic empowerment for themselves. We believe
that this model provides a strategic entry for
HDSA’s and circumvents most of the identified bar-
riers, without significantly harming the MOC’s that
will continue to enjoy a ninety-five percent market
share, and would continue to export products and
generate huge returns, without competition from
the new entrant.
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